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Research Article
The phenomenon of blindsight (Weiskrantz, Warrington, 
Sanders, & Marshall, 1974) has had a powerful influence 
on the development of psychology and neuroscience 
because it challenges the intuition that metacognitive 
awareness must necessarily accompany discriminative 
accuracy. Studies of blindsight, which may be exhibited 
following damage to the primary visual cortex, demon-
strate that substantial decision accuracy (e.g., discriminat-
ing between visual stimuli) can occur in the absence of 
metacognitive insight into that ability; blindsight patients 
classically report being blind to the stimuli that they so 
deftly categorize. In this article, we introduce a related 
phenomenon that has the potential to similarly transform 
psychology’s understanding of metacognition and its 
relationship to the distinction between conscious and 
unconscious processing. We term this phenomenon blind 
insight, and it can be thought of as the reverse of blind-
sight; it is characterized by accurate metacognitive 
discrimination (i.e., knowing when you are right or 
wrong) in the reliable absence of decision accuracy.
Metacognition, and in particular the ability to assess 
the accuracy of knowledge states, is fundamental to 
understanding executive processes (e.g., Koriat, 2007), 
the nature of memory (e.g., Mazzoni, Scoboria, & Harvey, 
2010), good educational practice (e.g., Koriat, 2012), 
gambling (Lueddeke & Higham, 2011), development 
(Beck, McColgan, Robinson, & Rowley, 2011), cognitive 
differences between species (Smith, Beran, Couchman, 
Coutinho, & Boomer, 2009), social interaction (Frith, 
2012), mental illness (Hamm et al., 2012), and the distinc-
tion between conscious and unconscious processes in 
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Abstract
Blindsight and other examples of unconscious knowledge and perception demonstrate dissociations between 
judgment accuracy and metacognition: Studies reveal that participants’ judgment accuracy can be above chance 
while their confidence ratings fail to discriminate right from wrong answers. Here, we demonstrated the opposite 
dissociation: a reliable relationship between confidence and judgment accuracy (demonstrating metacognition) despite 
judgment accuracy being no better than chance. We evaluated the judgments of 450 participants who completed an 
AGL task. For each trial, participants decided whether a stimulus conformed to a given set of rules and rated their 
confidence in that judgment. We identified participants who performed at chance on the discrimination task, utilizing a 
subset of their responses, and then assessed the accuracy and the confidence-accuracy relationship of their remaining 
responses. Analyses revealed above-chance metacognition among participants who did not exhibit decision accuracy. 
This important new phenomenon, which we term blind insight, poses critical challenges to prevailing models of 
metacognition grounded in signal detection theory.
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both perception (Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010) and 
 learning (Dienes & Seth, 2010).
Given the importance of metacognition to such a wide 
variety of research endeavors, there has been a strong 
motivation both to refine its accurate bias-free measure-
ment and elucidate the underlying cognitive architecture. 
Signal detection theory (SDT) provides a useful method 
to measure stimulus-discrimination accuracy indepen-
dently of response bias (Lau, 2008; Lau & Passingham, 
2006; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) and has been widely 
adopted and extended for the assessment of metacogni-
tion (Barrett, Dienes, & Seth, 2013; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & 
Whitmore, 2003; Ko & Lau, 2012; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; 
Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010; 
see Fig. 1). The measure of sensitivity provided by SDT is 
generally termed Type I d′ (d′1) when computed for stim-
ulus discrimination and Type II d′ (d′2) when computed 
for metacognitive discrimination. For a given two-alterna-
tive forced-choice judgment, d′1 provides an estimate of 
the relationship between response and target, and d′2 
provides an estimate of the relationship between confi-
dence and accuracy. In addition to providing a mecha-
nism for measuring metacognition, the SDT framework 
has formed the basis of a variety of theoretical models of 
metacognition, decision making, and awareness more 
generally (Clifford, Arabzadeh, & Harris, 2008; Maniscalco 
& Lau, 2012; Pleskac & Busemeyer, 2010; Scott & Dienes, 
2008; Snodgrass, Bernat, & Shevrin, 2004). However, 
while the benefit of and rationale for applying SDT to 
measure metacognition is clear, its adoption in cognitive 
models of metacognition is less well justified.
In its classical form, SDT offers a hierarchical frame-
work whereby information available to the metacognitive 
judgment derives from the same signal exploited by the 
first-order discriminative process. Indeed, it can be theo-
retically demonstrated that an SDT framework (with 
some straightforward assumptions) cannot give rise to 
metacognitive insight in the absence of decision accuracy 
(Barrett et al., 2013). While there is intuitive appeal of an 
arrangement in which confidence in a judgment derives 
from the strength of the signal driving the first-order deci-
sion, a purely bottom-up hierarchical configuration is at 
odds with both neuroanatomical and neurophysiological 
evidence. A growing body of data indicates that both 
bottom-up (feed-forward) and top-down (feedback, 
recurrent) connections and processing make crucial con-
tributions to perception, with the latter being particularly 
vital to attentional grouping and awareness (Bowman, 
Schlaghecken, & Eimer, 2006; Jaskowski & Verleger, 2007; 
Salin & Bullier, 1995).
Research exploring individual differences in metacog-
nition is similarly suggestive of interactions between low-
level sensory decisions and metacognitive processes. 
Fleming, Weil, Nagy, Dolan, and Rees (2010) demon-
strated that individual differences in metacognitive per-
formance on a perceptual decision task were correlated 
with gray-matter volume in the anterior prefrontal cortex 
and white-matter microstructure connected with this 
region. Crucially, the anterior prefrontal cortex receives 
input from higher-order cortical regions rather than from 
early sensory regions, which is consistent with a role in 
metacognitive judgment rather than in simple perceptual 
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Fig. 1. Schematic illustrating general principles of signal detection theory. The dashed curve shows the signal distribu-
tion when the stimulus is absent (or ungrammatical, new, etc.), and the solid curve shows the distribution when the stim-
ulus is present (or grammatical, old, etc.). The index d ′1 is the distance between the means of these two distributions in 
units of the standard deviation of the stimulus-absent distribution. The stimulus is classified as present or absent depend-
ing on whether the signal is, respectively, greater or less than the (Type I) decision criterion. There is confidence in 
that judgment if the signal is greater than the upper confidence threshold or lower than the lower confidence threshold.
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decisions. In contrast, other decision-making-related 
regions (e.g., posterior parietal cortex) receive inputs 
from early sensory regions and have been shown to sup-
port the primary perceptual decision (Kiani & Shadlen, 
2009). Other researchers have demonstrated a dissocia-
tion between reaction times and confidence that is also at 
odds with typical models of how confidence arises 
(Wilimzig, Tsuchiya, Fahle, Einhaeuser, & Koch, 2008).
Although the application of SDT to metacognition 
enjoys increasing popularity, it is by no means the only 
approach to modeling the confidence-accuracy relation-
ship. The metamemory literature offers a range of theo-
retical approaches based on concepts such as cue 
utilization (Koriat, 2007). In cue utilization, factors as 
diverse as fluency and brightness have been shown to 
influence confidence (Busey, Tunnicliff, Loftus, & Loftus, 
2000; Oppenheimer, 2008), though such cues can be 
unrelated to the accuracy of first-order judgments and, 
therefore, may not provide a veridical source of 
metacognition.
In the research reported here, we focused specifically 
on the SDT framework. We sought to evaluate whether 
metacognition and first-order decision accuracy can be 
dissociated in a manner incompatible with the SDT 
framework and, in so doing, offer clear constraints on the 
type of model able to account for this characteristically 
human cognitive process. To accomplish this, we exam-
ined metacognitive performance in artificial-grammar 
learning (AGL; Pothos, 2007; Reber, 1967), a paradigm in 
which after incidental exposure to apparently random 
strings of letters, participants classify new strings as obey-
ing or contravening an inherent set of rules. The AGL 
task has proven particularly useful in the study of implicit 
learning and is well known for demonstrating decision 
accuracy in the absence of confidence (i.e., a knowledge 
state equivalent to blindsight; e.g., Dienes, Altmann, 
Kwan, & Goode, 1995). Here, we revealed the opposite 
dissociation—blind insight—by establishing an unbiased 
selection of participants who exhibited chance perfor-
mance and then examining their metacognitive 
accuracy.
Method
Participants
Participants were 450 student volunteers (227 male, 223 
female) ages 18 to 40 years (M = 22, SD = 3.53), each of 
whom were paid £3 or given course credit to take part in 
one of eight AGL experiments. The current study used all 
data available from standard AGL studies completed in 
the first author’s research lab at the University of Sussex 
in the previous 5 years.1 All participants were naive to the 
experimental hypotheses and were randomly assigned to 
condition in each study. All experiments received ethical 
approval by the University of Sussex Life Sciences ethics 
committee and were conducted in accordance with the 
Declaration of Helsinki.
Materials
Two finite-state grammars (Grammar A and Grammar B, 
both from Reber, 1969) were used to generate grammar 
strings between five and nine characters in length. 
Training sets comprised either 15 or 16 strings (depend-
ing on the experiment) selected from the grammar to 
which the participant had been assigned and repeated 
three times in random orders. The test set comprised 
either 60 or 64 strings (depending on the experiment), 
including half from each grammar that had not been 
used during training. Strings were presented in black on 
a white background at the center of a computer screen.
Procedure
Training strings were presented under the guise of a 
short-term memory task, with each string presented for 
memorization for 5 s, followed by a brief recall task 
before the next string appeared. The presentation order 
of both training and test strings was separately random-
ized for each participant. After training, participants were 
informed that the order of letters in the training strings 
had obeyed a complex set of rules and that they were to 
classify a new set of strings, exactly half of which would 
obey the same rules. Test strings were presented one at a 
time, and participants were asked to indicate the follow-
ing without time constraints: (a) how familiar the string 
seemed to them on a scale from 0 to 100, (b) whether or 
not the string was grammatical (i.e., obeyed the rules), 
(c) how confident they were in their grammaticality judg-
ment on a scale from 50 to 100 (50 = 50:50 chance of 
being right or wrong, 100 = complete certainty of being 
right), and (d) the basis for their grammaticality judgment 
(random guessing, intuition, familiarity, a rule or rules 
they had derived, or recollection).
Design
A dual-grammar design was employed in which half the 
participants were trained on Grammar A and half on 
Grammar B. At test, all participants classified the same set 
of test strings, all of which were different from the train-
ing strings. Precisely half of the test strings conformed to 
Grammar A, and half conformed to Grammar B. Thus, 
the nongrammatical test strings for one group were gram-
matical for the other group, which eliminated the need 
for an untrained control group. The key independent 
variable was grammatical status, manipulated within 
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subject (grammatical vs. ungrammatical). There were two 
dependent variables of interest: first-order decision accu-
racy, for which we computed d′ for the relationship 
between grammaticality judgments and the true gram-
matical status (d′1), and metacognition, for which we 
computed d′ for the relationship between confidence (no 
confidence whatsoever vs. some degree of confidence) 
and accuracy, typically termed Type II d′ (d′2). An alpha 
of .05 was adopted for all significance tests.
Results
Approach to analysis
Our objective was to assess whether reliable metacogni-
tive accuracy could exist in the absence of first-order 
accuracy. To test this, we identified that subset of par-
ticipants whose decision accuracy was equivalent to 
chance. To avoid incorrect inferences, it was important 
that this selection be robust to biases arising from 
regression toward the mean. Specifically, analysis 
needed to be conducted on a sample of trials that had 
not itself been subject to the bias imposed by the selec-
tion process. This was accomplished by selecting par-
ticipants on the basis of a subset of their trials and 
analyzing the remainder.
While a repeated random subsampling method might 
typically be applied to select trial subsets in a maximally 
unbiased fashion, our data contained a predictable linear 
trend that precluded this approach. It is an established 
phenomenon in AGL that performance (d′1) declines 
across the test phase of a dual-grammar design (e.g., see 
Mealor & Dienes, 2013, who demonstrated this for the 
same dual-grammar design used in the experiments ana-
lyzed here). A likely explanation for the effect is the 
increasing interference that ungrammatical strings—
encountered only during the test phase—have on the 
representation of valid grammatical strings. This same 
linear trend over time was significant in the present data, 
F(1, 282) = 17.43, p < .001 (see Fig. 2).
Where performance changes systematically in this 
way, chance performance on a random subsample of tri-
als cannot reliably predict chance performance on the 
remainder. Consequently, we adopted a linear sampling 
approach (i.e., selecting participants who performed at 
chance in early test trials and analyzing their later trials), 
thus taking advantage of the tendency for performance 
to decrease over time. For this approach to be effective, 
the selected subset needs to be sufficiently large that per-
formance for that subset is representative of performance 
across subsequent trials. We first attempted a selection 
including participants for whom d′1 was less than or 
equal to 0 for the first 50% of trials. However, 50% did not 
provide a sufficiently representative estimate of d′1; the 
d′1 for the remaining trials was significantly greater than 
zero (M = 0.20, SE = 0.08), t(52) = 2.57, p = .013, d = 0.36, 
which illustrates the issue of regression toward the mean 
and prevented the intended analysis. We therefore 
selected participants for whom d′1 was less than or equal 
to 0 for the first 75% of trials. This percentage provided a 
sufficiently representative estimate such that d′1 for these 
participants was not significantly different from zero in 
the remaining trials (M = −0.06, SE = 0.11), t(32) = −0.49, 
p = .626, d = 0.09.
The same selection process was applied to identify 
participants who reliably performed above chance (d′1 > 
0) so as to permit metacognitive performance to be con-
trasted in those who did and did not exhibit decision 
accuracy. Only participants for whom both d′1 and d′2 
could be computed for the analysis subset (i.e., who had 
nonzero counts in every cell) were included; above 
chance: n = 165, at chance: n = 33. The number of par-
ticipants reliably performing at chance was, as antici-
pated, relatively small. However, simulations conducted 
with these numbers (reported later) provide reassurance 
that our findings did not arise from sample-size bias.
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Fig. 2. Mean classification performance (d ′1) for each quarter of the test phase. Error 
bars indicate ±1 SEM. n = 283.
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We further computed a Bayes factor to establish the 
extent to which these data provide evidence for the null 
hypothesis (d′1 = 0) for the at-chance group, rather than 
simply reflecting insensitivity. Adopting the procedure 
advocated by Dienes (2011), the alternative hypothesis 
was d′1 following a half-normal distribution with a stan-
dard deviation equivalent to the d′1 observed for partici-
pants showing above-chance decision accuracy in the 
first 75% of trials (0.38). The resulting Bayes factor of 0.19 
was less than one-third and hence represents strong evi-
dence for the null hypothesis. This selection process thus 
provided an unbiased sample of participants who did not 
exhibit first-order accuracy and, therefore, permitted us 
to examine their metacognitive performance under these 
circumstances.
Metacognitive accuracy in the absence 
of first-order accuracy
Figure 3 illustrates the mean d′1 and d′2 for the analysis 
trials (final 25%); results are plotted separately for partici-
pants who performed above chance in the selection trials 
(first 75%) and those who performed at or below chance 
in the selection trials. Analyses were conducted listwise 
to ensure that the means for each index were based on 
the same participants. Among participants who exhibited 
first-order accuracy in the selection trials, d′2 was signifi-
cantly greater than chance, t(164) = 4.65, p < .001, d = 
0.36, and showed the typical relationship with d′1, spe-
cifically that the mean of d′2 is approximately half that of 
d′1 (Krueger, Klapoetke, & Mattler, 2011). Crucially, 
among participants who did not exhibit first-order accu-
racy, d′2 remained significantly greater than chance, 
t(32) = 2.30, p = .028, d = 0.40, and was not significantly 
different from the d′2 of participants who did exhibit first-
order accuracy, t(196) = 0.17, p = .868, d = 0.03. Thus, the 
analysis revealed reliable metacognitive performance 
among participants who did not exhibit first-order deci-
sion accuracy.
Although these analyses were based on d′2, alternative 
measures of metacognition revealed the same pattern of 
results. Meta-d′, devised by Maniscalco and Lau (2012) to 
be independent of bias due to the Type I criterion, was 
significantly above chance among participants who did 
not exhibit first-order accuracy (M = 1.10, SE = 0.43), 
t(32) = 2.57, p = .015, d = 0.45, and nonsignificantly dif-
ferent from that observed among participants who exhib-
ited first-order accuracy (M = 0.72, SE = 0.17), t(196) = 
0.87, p = .384, d = 0.16.
Similarly, the difference in the percentage of correct 
judgments when participants were confident versus not 
confident, known as the confidence-accuracy slope 
(Dienes & Seth, 2010), was again significantly greater than 
zero among participants who did not exhibit first-order 
accuracy (mean difference = 9%, SE = 4%), t(32) = 2.26, p = 
.031, d = 0.42, and nonsignificantly different from the slope 
observed among participants who exhibited first-order 
accuracy (mean difference = 8%, SE = 2%), t(196) = 0.021, 
p = .836, d = 0.05. Regardless of the index used, the results 
reflect the same underlying phenomenon: Participants’ 
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Fig. 3. Mean first-order accuracy (d ′1) and metacognitive accuracy (d ′2) for the analy-
sis trials, separately for participants who did and did not exhibit above-chance first-
order accuracy in the selection trials. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. Asterisks indicate 
results significantly different from zero (p < .05).
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confidence reports expressed reliable knowledge of when 
their grammaticality judgments were right or wrong despite 
those same grammaticality judgments failing to discrimi-
nate grammatical from ungrammatical strings.
The source of metacognitive accuracy
To explore the source of the observed metacognition 
seen in participants lacking decision accuracy, we con-
ducted a 2 (judgment: grammatical vs. ungrammatical) × 
2 (confidence: confident vs. guess) within-subject analy-
sis of variance on the proportion of correct judgments 
(see Fig. 4). This analysis revealed no main effect of judg-
ment, F(1, 26) = 0.15, p = .702, ηp2 = .01; a marginal effect 
of confidence, F(1, 26) = 3.91, p = .059, ηp2 = .13; and a 
marginal judgment-by-confidence interaction, F(1, 26) = 
3.12, p = .089, ηp2 = .11. These findings reflect the fact 
that the proportion of correct judgments was below 
chance for guesses, t(32) = 3.36, p = .002, d = 0.58, but 
close to chance for judgments made with some confi-
dence, t(32) = 0.14, p = .890, d = 0.02, and that this differ-
ence was marginally stronger for grammatical than for 
ungrammatical classifications (cf. Fleming & Dolan, 2010; 
Higham, Perfect, & Bruno, 2009).
Overall, these findings suggest that the observed meta-
cognition (in the absence of decision accuracy) reflects a 
tendency for judgments made without confidence to 
exhibit below-chance accuracy, while confident judg-
ments remain at chance. One possible interpretation of 
this difference is that there was some form of implicit 
error monitoring taking place that was expressed as 
reduced confidence where a wrong answer was made. If 
this was the case, however, the information exploited by 
the error-monitoring process was clearly unavailable to 
the preceding classification judgment.
Effect of delay between judgments
Participants made grammaticality and confidence judg-
ments consecutively, with confidence judgments neces-
sarily following the grammaticality judgments. This 
arrangement gives rise to two potential issues. The first is 
that during the momentary pause between judgments, 
participants’ knowledge state may continue to stabilize, 
and metacognitive performance, deriving from the latter 
judgment, may show greater accuracy as a result. Some 
evidence for this has been identified in the context of 
reaction-time responses (Baranski & Petrusic, 2001; 
Charles, Van Opstal, Marti, & Dehaene, 2013; Pleskac & 
Busemeyer, 2010). However, in our experiments, there 
was no time constraint on judgments and, therefore, no 
obvious reason why a (first-order) judgment would be 
made before a stable knowledge state had been achieved. 
Furthermore, when Tunney and Shanks (2003, Experiments 
1a and 1b) contrasted d′2 for confidence judgments made 
simultaneously with grammaticality judgments with those 
made following the grammaticality judgment (as we did 
here), they observed a nonsignificant reduction in d′2 
(mean difference = −0.10, SE = 0.18), t(22) = 0.54, p = 
.593, d = 0.77, a finding that is more consistent with meta-
cognition decaying during the delay rather than increas-
ing. The d′2 observed in the current study (M = 0.23, SE = 
0.10) is also significantly larger than the change they 
observed, t(54) = 1.70, p = .048 (one tailed), which pro-
vides further reassurance that the effect was not the result 
of the sequential arrangement of judgments.
A second issue arises from the potential for participants 
to make errors when reporting grammaticality judgments. 
As there were no time constraints, very few errors were 
anticipated; nonetheless, if a participant were confident 
that a string was grammatical but inadvertently pressed 
“ungrammatical,” or vice versa, then they might choose to 
report no confidence to reflect that error. Assuming they 
were applying veridical knowledge, this could result in 
below-chance accuracy for judgments attributed no confi-
dence. For example, if we assume that participants’ 
knowledge on average permitted 60% classification accu-
racy (10% above chance), then when applied without 
error, their judgments would have 60% accuracy and be 
reported to have been made with some confidence. In 
contrast, when they applied that knowledge but inadver-
tently pressed the wrong button (and realized this), the 
judgments would have 40% accuracy (10% below chance) 
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Fig. 4. Mean proportion of correct grammaticality judgments among 
participants who did not exhibit first-order accuracy. Results are shown 
for “grammatical,” “ungrammatical,” and all judgments made with and 
without confidence. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM. The dashed line indi-
cates chance performance. Asterisks indicate results significantly differ-
ent from chance (p < .05). n = 33.
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and would be reported to have been made with no con-
fidence. As can be seen, the maximum extent to which 
the accuracy of no-confidence judgments could be 
reduced below chance by this mechanism is limited to the 
equivalent above-chance accuracy of confident judgments 
(10% in this illustration). Therefore, if this account applies, 
we should have observed above-chance accuracy in con-
fident judgments at least equivalent to the below-chance 
accuracy of judgments made without confidence. This 
was not observed. Judgments without confidence were 
8% below chance (M = 42%, SE = 2%), so the accuracy of 
confident judgments would need to be at least 58% (8% 
above chance). In fact, confident judgments were numeri-
cally at chance (M = 50%, SE = 2%), significantly less accu-
rate than 8% above chance (M = 58%, SE = 2%), t(32) = 
2.27, p = .030, d = 0.39. Thus, the absence of confidence 
in incorrect judgments cannot have arisen from inadver-
tently pressing the wrong button.
Inequality of variances
In an SDT model, if the underlying signals exploited to 
classify grammatical and ungrammatical strings had 
unequal variances, this could in principle result in an 
inflated estimate of d′2 (Barrett et al., 2013). While it is 
impossible to observe any putative grammaticality signal 
directly, previous research has shown that subjective rat-
ings of familiarity for test strings strongly predict both 
grammaticality judgments and confidence ratings (Scott & 
Dienes, 2008, 2010a). We therefore used the variance in 
these subjective familiarity ratings to estimate that of the 
underlying grammaticality signals. While the ratio of vari-
ances for familiarity ratings attributed to grammatical ver-
sus ungrammatical strings did not differ significantly from 
1 (M = 1.29, SE = 0.19), t(25) = 1.60, p = .122, d = 0.30, we 
nonetheless undertook a simulation analysis to establish 
the likelihood of the observed d′2 resulting from this ratio.
The parameters detailed here apply to both the fol-
lowing simulation and the criterion-jitter simulation 
described in the following section: On each trial, the 
grammaticality signal was generated as a Gaussian ran-
dom variable, with M = 0 and SD = 1 for an ungrammati-
cal string, and M = d′1 and SD = 1.27 for a grammatical 
string (i.e., the ratio of variances was set at 1.62, the 
upper end of the 95% confidence interval, to make it 
most likely that our simulations could explain away the 
results); the decision criterion was based on the observed 
proportion of strings judged to be grammatical (M = 0.47, 
SE = 0.03); the confidence thresholds were based on the 
observed proportions of guesses for grammatical (M = 
0.32, SE = 0.05) and ungrammatical classifications (M = 
0.52, SE = 0.04); and each simulated experiment included 
the same number of participants and trials on which the 
empirical analysis was conducted.
We simulated the experiment 1,000 times, assuming a 
d′1 of zero. The observed probability of obtaining a value 
of d′2 as large as the empirically observed value of 0.23 
was p = .010. Thus, we can conclude that the observed 
metacognition is unlikely to represent an artifact resulting 
from inequality of variances.
Criterion jitter
If the criterion employed in making grammaticality judg-
ments was subject to jitter, this could result in an under-
estimate of d′1 while potentially leaving d′2 relatively 
unchanged (Mueller & Weidemann, 2008), again poten-
tially accounting for our main findings. We therefore con-
ducted a second SDT simulation to evaluate the extent to 
which the estimated d′1 of zero may have resulted from 
criterion jitter. Given the most commonly observed ratio 
between d′1 and d′2 of 2:1 (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler, 
2001), to obtain a d′2 approximately equal to the observed 
0.23, we assumed the true d′1 was equal to 0.46. We then 
implemented a substantial jitter in the criterion by giving 
it a Gaussian distribution of standard deviation 1.5. Note 
that this level of jitter is the logical maximum assuming 
that the signal distributions overlap by approximately 
50%, and the criterion is based solely on the last observed 
string (instead of a more stable running average). 
Simulating the experiment 1,000 times with these param-
eters revealed that the probability of observing d′1 as low 
as zero was p = .002. The mean simulated estimate of d′1 
was 0.26 (SE = 0.003), which is substantially greater than 
the upper bound of the 95% confidence interval on the 
empirically observed value (M = −0.06, 95% confidence 
interval = [−0.29, 0.18]). Thus, we can conclude that the 
presence of substantial metacognition observed among 
participants who did not exhibit first-order accuracy 
(d′1 = 0) was not due to an underestimate of d′1 resulting 
from criterion jitter.
Discussion
We exploited the AGL paradigm to evaluate metacogni-
tive performance in participants who lacked first-order 
decision accuracy. Analysis was conducted on data inde-
pendent of that used in the selection of participants, and 
additional analyses and simulations eliminated effects of 
a delay between judgments, unequal variance, and crite-
rion jitter as alternative explanations for the findings. The 
results revealed significant metacognitive discrimination 
independent of first-order decision accuracy. Specifically, 
confidence reports expressed reliable knowledge of 
whether judgments had been right or wrong despite the 
judgments themselves showing chance levels of discrimi-
nation. While the phenomenon of blindsight challenges 
the intuition that metacognitive performance must 
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necessarily follow from reliable decision accuracy, the 
phenomenon of blind insight challenges the intuition 
that decision accuracy must necessarily exist for there to 
be metacognitive discrimination of the veracity of those 
first-order judgments. While we see no reason to expect 
this phenomenon to be unique to the context of AGL, 
additional research is needed to determine the extent to 
which our results generalize across distinct paradigms, 
including perceptual decisions.
What are the implications of our results for theoretical 
models of metacognition? Models that rest on SDT fit 
naturally with bottom-up hierarchical arrangements in 
which low-level discriminations provide the signals sup-
porting high-level metacognitive discriminations. These 
models can naturally account for dissociations between 
(low-level) decision accuracy and metacognition as seen 
in blindsight and unconscious knowledge by simply 
assuming that a failure in the metacognitive process can 
leave lower-level discriminative processes intact. In con-
trast, blind insight represents a dissociation that is funda-
mentally at odds with a purely bottom-up hierarchical 
relationship relating first-order decision processes to 
metacognition, because the absence of reliable decision 
accuracy precludes the availability of signals supporting 
above-chance metacognitive performance on these mod-
els. Our observation of blind insight therefore establishes 
that the metacognitive process must either draw on infor-
mation additional to that available to the first-order deci-
sion process or exploit the same information in a 
substantially different way. Such an arrangement is not 
readily implemented by models that adhere closely to 
SDT in assuming that metacognitive judgments are made 
on the same signal underlying first-order decisions 
(Clifford et al., 2008; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012; Pleskac & 
Busemeyer, 2010; Scott & Dienes, 2008; Snodgrass et al., 
2004). While amendments to these models might accom-
modate the blind-insight phenomenon, any such amend-
ments would represent a fundamental departure from the 
standard SDT framework. In short, significant metacogni-
tion (d′2 > 0) in the absence of first-order accuracy (d′1 = 
0) is incompatible with a classical signal detection frame-
work (see Barrett et al., 2013).
To account for blind insight therefore requires a model 
architecture that less closely couples metacognitive per-
formance to the signal driving first-order judgments. 
Progress in this direction has been made by Timmermans, 
Schilbach, Pasquali, and Cleeremans (2012), who describe 
a “hybrid” neural network model in which first-order 
decision processes and second-order metacognitive pro-
cesses are supported by independent networks. While 
both networks are feed-forward architectures trained 
using standard back-propagation algorithms, the meta-
cognitive network takes as input not simply the output of 
the first-order network but rather the difference between 
its input and output. It is interesting that during training 
on a blindsight simulation, this model exhibited a pattern 
of results similar to blind insight; however, this was only 
a transient stage of model dynamics rather than a stable 
state as in our data. Moreover, their model remains faith-
ful to the assumptions of SDT by proposing unidirec-
tional bottom-up signal flow (back-propagation is used 
only for updating connection strengths).
Given the inability of SDT-based models to account 
for blind insight, our data suggest that a more radical 
revision of metacognition models is required. One poten-
tial direction for revision would take into account the 
evidence, mentioned in the Introduction, that neural 
dynamics underlying perceptual decisions involve coun-
terflowing bottom-up and top-down neural signals 
(Bowman et al., 2006; Jaskowski & Verleger, 2007; Salin 
& Bullier, 1995). A framework for interpreting these 
countercurrent dynamics is provided by predictive pro-
cessing, which proposes that top-down projections con-
vey predictions (expectations) about the causes of 
sensory signals, with bottom-up projections communicat-
ing mismatches (prediction errors) between expected 
and observed signals across hierarchical levels, with their 
mutual dynamics unfolding according to the principles of 
Bayesian inference (Clark, 2013). Future models of meta-
cognition could leverage this framework to propose that 
both first-order and metacognitive discriminations emerge 
from the interaction of top-down expectations and bot-
tom-up prediction errors, for example by allowing top-
down signals to reshape the probability distributions of 
evidence on which decision thresholds are imposed 
(Barrett et al., 2013). We can at this stage only speculate 
as to whether such a model might provide the means to 
account for the blind-insight phenomenon and recognize 
that predictive coding is just one among a variety of 
potential frameworks that could be applied to that 
 challenge (Timmermans et al., 2012).
In summary, blind insight demonstrates a previously 
undescribed dissociation between second-order aware-
ness and first-order performance and in so doing presents 
a critical challenge to prevailing models of metacognition.
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Note
1. Data for the present study were drawn from all participants in 
the four experiments reported in Scott and Dienes (2008; N = 80 
each), Experiment 1 of Scott and Dienes (2010b; N = 40), and 
three unpublished studies (N = 30 each). Sample sizes for all of 
the experiments were based on estimated numbers required to 
achieve reasonable power for the individual objectives of each 
experiment. In each case, data collection stopped when that 
predetermined number was met.
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